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Abstract—In this paper, we address a key issue of de-
signing architectures and algorithms which generate op-
timal demand response in a decentralized manner for a
smart-grid consisting of several stochastic renewables and
dynamic loads. By optimal demand response, we refer to the
demand response which maximizes the utility of the agents
connected to the smart-grid. By decentralized we refer to
the desirable case where neither the independent system
operator (ISO) needs to know the dynamics/utilities of the
agents, nor do the agents need to have a knowledge of the
dynamics/utilities of other agents connected to the grid. The
communication between the ISO and agents is restricted
to the ISO announcing a pricing policy and the agents
responding with their energy generation/consumption bids
in response to the pricing policy.
We provide a complete solution for both the deterministic
and stochastic cases. It features a price iteration scheme
that results in optimality of social welfare. We also provide
an optimal solution for the case where there is a common
randomness affecting and observed by all agents. This
solution can be computationally complex, and we pose
approximations. For the more general partially observed
randomness case, we exhibit a relaxation that significantly
reduces complexity. We also provide an approximation strat-
egy that leads to a model predictive control (MPC) approach.
Simulation results comparing the resulting optimal demand
response with the existing architectures employed by the
ISO illustrate the benefit in social welfare utility realized by
our scheme. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is
the first work of its kind to explicitly mark out the optimal
response of dynamic demand.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, given demand (or a demand forecast),
generation (or the planned generation) has been dis-
patched so as to balance demand in power systems. Since
there are many generators capable of producing power at
different cost curves, it is desirable to allocate the total
power generation among the generators so that the total
cost of generating the required power is minimized. This
role of determining which generators are selected, and
how much power they produce, has been played by the
Independent System Operator (ISO).
This economic dispatch of generators is done by so-
liciting production bids (power vs. price curves) from
each generator, and then, given the demand, choosing
the generators such that the overall cost to purchase
the power is minimized. Motivated by the problem of
integrating renewable power generation from sources
such as wind and solar [1], we consider the problem of
demand response, i.e., adjusting demand so that it can be
part of the flexibility to match the intermittent generation
[2]. The process of increasing or decreasing demand can
be accomplished by decreasing or increasing the price
of power. Thus the problem becomes one of choosing
the level of demand as well as allocating the required
generation among the various producers of power from
fossil fuel sources such as coal or gas.
An additional consideration is that both power genera-
tors as well as loads are dynamic systems. Generators, for
example, have ramping constraints as well as maximum
power constraints. Similarly, analysis of load data shows
that loads also have certain dynamic constraints [3].
Thus, all variables, including price as well as generator
power outputs as well as loads, are functions of time.
A third consideration is that renewable power pro-
duction is uncertain, which we model as a stochastic
process. Thus, in addressing the dynamic evolution of the
future demand as well as future non-renewable power
generation over time, one needs to take future uncertainty
of renewable power generation into account.
In this paper, we consider the resulting overall problem
faced by the ISO: Given stochastic renewable generation
which is disclosed causally in time, how should an ISO
choose the price causally as a function of time, and
thereby the level of demand response elicited, and then
allocate the net remaining generation among various con-
ventional generators. A further consideration which we
will neglect in this paper is that the network constraints
are satisfied. However, this can be incorporated into the
setup that we develop in this paper.
There are some complexities that are involved in the
problem, and some constraints that a desirable solution
has to satisfy. It is desirable that the communication from
the ISO to the generators or loads contain only the price of
power in each market interval. Also it would be desirable
that the communication from each generator and load to
the ISO, at each time instant only be the resulting power-
price point for desired production and demand response
respectively. In particular, we would not like to require
that each load provide a dynamic model of its behavior
as well as its utility function to the ISO, and similarly for
each generator. Not only is this a lot of information that
the agents may not want disclose for reasons of privacy or
business, but it also implies that the ISO solve a gigantic
optimization problem encompassing every single agent in
the system with all agents’ utility functions.
Thus we would like the system-wide optimization be
conducted by the agents themselves in a distributed man-
ner, coupled only by the price announced by the ISO.
Additional complexities are introduced by the fact that the
agents are dynamic systems as well as the fact that the
renewable power generation is stochastic. Our approach
attempts to provide a comprehensive solution that takes
into consideration all individual agents’ utility functions.
It has one feature that would be desirable to eliminate.
At each time our approach requires that the ISO interact
with the agents in an extended transaction. The ISO
announces a tentative price, and the agents respond with
power generation and consumption levels. Based on these
responses, the ISO again announces a tentative price, and
so on. This process continues till the price converges. We
see no way to eliminate this bidding process, and wonder
if it is well nigh impossible in general since the agents
need to somehow convey to the other agents how they
respond to prices. At any rate, this is a significant open
problem.
We examine a sequence of models, a determinis-
tic model, a common completely observed randomness
model, and a partially observed randomness model. For
the deterministic model our solution is complete and
leads to social welfare optimality. Next we consider the
case where there is a common randomness affecting all
agents and observed by each of them. This of course
includes the case where only certain portions of the
overall randomness affect individual agents and in differ-
ent ways. In this case we propose a complete solution,
in principle, which leads to social welfare optimality
of the utility. In this case, we also propose a scheme
to reduce complexity that leads to a model predictive
approach. In the most general case where the different
agents experience differing randomness not observable
by other agents, we propose a relaxation that leads to
a significant reduction in complexity. We also show that
our MPC approach extends to this case. We also represent
simulations comparing our algorithms with the approach
used presently by the ISO and illustrate the improvement
in utility that can be realized.
Overall, our approach provides a theory for the oper-
ation of the ISO in an environment where it is needed
to integrate stochastic renewables, demand response,
and dynamic and other constraints as well as uncer-
tainties in both generation and loads. The solution re-
quires communication only of prices and energy produc-
tion/consumption responses, as is desirable. Specifically
it is not necessary for the ISO to be aware of the dynam-
ics of producers or consumers or their individual utility
functions. Similarly, the various agents need only know
their own dynamic system models and states and utility
function, and need not be aware of any attributes of other
users, or even the existence of other users. We hope our
approach leads to a firm foundation for the operation of
the next generation ISO.
One approach to procure Demand Response is direct
load control, where based on an agreement between
customers and the aggregator or utility, remote control of
certain devices (e.g., air conditioners, pumps etc.) is used
to manage their energy consumption [4]. The lack of user
privacy is a major barrier to large scale implementation.
The alternative is an incentive based approach such as
real-time pricing where users voluntarily manage their
consumption in response to a time-varying retail tariff
[5]. The challenge with this approach is the difficulty
faced by customers to manually respond to time-varying
prices. We envision a scenario where an intelligent agent
automatically manages the energy consumption schedul-
ing of the customer based on certain cost and comfort
settings selected by the user. The key issue in this case is
of designing an architecture which yields optimal demand
response in a decentralized manner while maintaining
user privacy. From the system operator point of view
the challenge is to optimally balance the system when
uncertainty arises both in supply and demand, without
resorting to the brute force and expensive option of
procuring large amounts of reserve and/or energy storage
[6].
We realize that the current smart grid suffers from the
key issues of renewable penetration and electricity price
fluctuations. Our approach of modeling the users by a dy-
namical system in lieu of following a ”static-optimization”
is the key to generate demand response that plays the
dual role of mitigating renewable penetration and price
fluctuation via utility optimization. Thus our goal is to
provide a framework in which Demand Response could
participate in both energy and ancillary service markets
[7], [8]. Of course, this demand response needs to be
optimized in order to achieve our pre-set goals. This
is done via utilization of the computational power and
latent energy storage that is present in the smart users
connected to the smart grid.
The paper is organized as follows: we begin with a
survey of some related works in Section II and give a
complete description of the problem in Section III. This is
followed by a discussion on iterative bidding schemes and
the ensuing optimal demand response in a deterministic
setting (Section IV) and stochastic setting (Section V).
Finally simulation results are shown (Section VI), which
support our theory.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
There have been many efforts since the deregulation
of the electricity sector on a market-based framework to
clear the system. Ilic et al. [9] proposed a two-layered ap-
proach that internalizes individual constraints of market
participants while allowing the ISO to manage the spatial
complexity. The approximated MPC algorithm is shown to
work in many realistic cases.
In order to analyze the strategic interactions between
the ISO and market participants, game theoretical ap-
proaches have been proposed in a number of paper.
Zhu et al. [10] use a Stackelberg game framework for
economic dispatch with demand response. The approach
uses a two person game with ISO as leader and users
aggregated into second player. The users change their
demand based on price signal so as to maximize their
payoff function. The ED problem considered is a single
time interval conventional dispatch without transmission
line constraints. Bu and Yu [11] models the interactions
between electricity retailers and customers as a Stackel-
berg game. This work considers the case of a monopoly
retailer where information about customers’ utility and
consumption pattern is available. Jia and Tong [12] uses
Stackelberg to study the energy consumption scheduling
problem for customers who are subjected to a time-
varying price which is determined one day ahead of
time. The trade-off between consumer surplus and retailer
profit under different pricing schemes is investigated.
Song et al. [13] applies a Markov decision process
(MDP) model to the bidding problem for generators
participating in electricity market. Gajjar et al. [14] ex-
tends this approach and uses actor-critic learning. Gao
et al. [15] presents a method for obtaining the bidding
strategy of market participants using parametric linear
programming. However, it assumes that market partic-
ipants have complete information on system conditions
and competitor strategies.
Wang et al. [16] formulates the trading of energy by
storage units as a noncooperative game. Under certain
assumptions for the strategy space and utility functions
a Nash equilibrium is shown to exist. An iterative al-
gorithm is used to reach equilibrium following which a
double auction is conducted. Mohsenian-Rad et al. [17]
proposes a distributed algorithm to obtain the optimal
energy consumption schedule for each user. The problem
of determining the user energy consumption schedule for
the whole day is formulated as a deterministic linear
program. Two problems are considered with two different
objectives: (i) minimize energy cost, and (ii) minimize the
peak to average ratio of demand.
One of the major challenges in the above approaches is
how to elicit optimal demand response without revealing
the inherent dynamic nature of the loads to the ISO. In
this paper, we model the users as stochastic dynamical
systems and generate the optimal demand response in a
decentralized and adaptive manner, thus maximizing the
sum total of the utilities of the users, which in-turn allows
for maximum renewable penetration and in controlling
price fluctuations.
III. NOTATION
Throughout the paper ω, ωi etc. will be used to denote
random variables. Also, random variables will be in cap-
itals, while their realizations in small letters, eg. random
variable X , and event {X = x}, etc.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a smart-grid in which there are a total
of N agents. Each agent may be either a consumer or
a producer of electricity. We model time as consisting
of discrete periods. At each discrete time t each agent
i obtains or supplies ui(t) units of energy (equivalently
power since it is proportional to it given the fixed period)
to the grid, with ui(t) > 0 signifying that user i supplies
energy to the grid at time t, while ui(t) < 0 signifying
an energy consumption from the grid by the i-th user. We
will suppose that there is net energy balance at each time
over the whole grid:
∑N
i=1 ui(t) = 0 for all t. This model
does allow for storage too, since each storage device can
be considered as an agent.
We model each agent as a dynamic system. The mo-
tivation in the case of an agent which is a generator
is that it has ramp up constraints, thus necessitating a
dynamic system model, or in the case of a load it may
have similar ramp down constraints as well as delay in
demand response. The state of the user i at time denoted
by xi(t) ∈ Xi evolves as,
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t)), t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. (1)
Thus the state of the grid resides on the space ⊗Xi.
We suppose that each agent i has a utility function
Fi(·) : Xi 7→ R, with the understanding that the user
prefers a state having higher utility. The total utility of
user i over the horizon {1, 2, . . . , T } is
∑T
t=1 Fi(xi(t)).
(The theory can be generalized in a straightforward way
to utilities that are time-dependent.) The model (1) can
incorporate constraints on inputs, for example reflecting
bounds on ramp rates, such as ui(t) ∈ Ui. In that case,
these constraint sets Ui are not dualized, but simply carry
over to the dual in (3). For simplicity of exposition we will
not explicitly consider this case in the treatment here, but
will consider such constraints in the numerical examples
in Section VII.
With the above set-up, we are led to the follow-
ing deterministic social welfare optimization problem
(DSWOP):
max
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Fi(xi(t))
subject to
∑
i
ui(t) = 0, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t)), for
t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (DSWOP)
Subsequently we will consider the stochastic version of
the problem caused by uncertainties due to weather, etc.
V. OPTIMAL DEMAND RESPONSE AND DECENTRALIZED
SOLUTION VIA BIDDING
The above problem can be interpreted as giving the
ISO the task of determining the T -dimensional vectors
ui := (ui(1), ui(2), . . . , ui(T )), for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , so as to
maximize the social welfare
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 Fi(xi(t)). In this
section, we will derive an easy-to-implement algorithm
that does so, while satisfying information and action
decentralization, with all communication between agents
restricted simply to being either price announcements or
purchasing or supply of energy decisions in response to
prices. The ISO simply determines the appropriate prices
causally, while each user optimizes its response causally.
The Lagrangian for the problem DSWOP is,
L(u1,u2, . . . ,uN ,λ)
:=
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Fi(xi(t))−
T∑
t=1
λ(t)
(
N∑
i=1
ui(t)
)
, (2)
where λ(t), t = 1, 2, . . . , T are the Lagrangian multipli-
ers associated with the constraints
∑
i Ui(t) = 0, t =
1, 2, . . . , T respectively. The Lagrange dual function is,
D(λ) = max
u1,u2,...,uN
L(u1,u2, . . . ,uN ,λ)
= max
u1,u2,...,uN
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
Fi(xi(t))− λ(t)ui(t)
)
, (3)
The objective function (3) can be decomposed agent
by agent since they are only coupled by price. Hence
we consider the optimal problem for agent i as one of
maximizing the objective
max
ui
T∑
t=1
Fi(xi(t)) − λ(t)ui(t). (4)
for the dynamic system (1). The optimal cost is a func-
tion of the initial condition and the Lagrange multi-
plier sequence λ = (λ(1), . . . , λ(T ))., and we denote it
Vi(xi(0),λ). Therefore,
D(λ) =
N∑
i=1
Vi(xi(0),λ).
We thus observe that the consideration of the dual prob-
lem has led us to a decentralized problem. Its solution
involves the ISO first announcing the price vector λ, and
then each agent i simply optimizing its own objective (4)
by determining its vector ui. Thus neither the ISO, nor the
other agents need to know the utility function of agent i.
The dual problem is to,
minD(λ) subject to
λ(1), . . . , λ(T ) ≥ 0. (5)
We will suppose that strong duality holds, i.e., the op-
timal values of DSWOP and (5) are equal. There are
several sufficient conditions for strong duality. For ex-
ample a sufficient condition is for the utility functions∑T
t=1 Fi(xi(t)) to be convex and the feasibility region
of the problem DSWOP to be non-empty. Denoting the
optimal solution of the Dual problem by λ⋆, we will
suppose that,
D(λ⋆) =
N∑
i=1
Vi(xi(0),λ
⋆)
= max
ui,i=1,2,...,N :∑
i
ui(t)=0,
∀t=1,2,...,T
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Fi(xi(t)).
The issue faced by the ISO is how to determine the
optimal price vector λ⋆. Since D(λ) as well as Vi(xi(0),λ)
are all concave functions of λ, will consider the use of the
sub-gradient method for iterating on the price-vector λ so
as to converge to the optimal price-vector λ⋆. Denoting
the sub-gradient by ∂D
∂λ
, we note that,
∂D
∂λ
=
N∑
i=1
∂Vi
∂λ
=
(
N∑
i=1
uλi (1),
N∑
i=1
uλi (2), . . . ,
N∑
i=1
uλi (T )
)
,
where uλi :=
(
uλi (1), u
λ
i (2), . . . , u
λ
i (T )
)
is the vector that
achieves the optimal utility for the i-th user for the price
vector λ in (4).
We see that the iterations on the price vector λ generate
the corresponding demand response (According to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, demand response
(DR) is defined as: “Changes in electric usage by end-
use customers from their normal consumption patterns in
response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or
to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity
use at times of high wholesale market prices or when
system reliability is jeopardized.”) [18]–[21],
DR(λ) =
∂uλ
∂λ
, (6)
where uλ contains the vectors uλi for agents i which are
consumers. DR is a useful quantity because the social
welfare of the grid depends upon it.
Based on the sub-gradient algorithm, we obtain the
following price iteration algorithm. Set k, the iteration
index to 0. The ISO declares a price vector λ0 (which is
chosen arbitrarily, but of course preferably close to the
true price vector).
• The users i for i = 1, 2, ..., N solve their individual
optimal control problems and calculate the u
λ(0)
i .
Then they separately submit their bids u
λ(0)
i .
• The ISO then updates the price vector as: λk+1 =
λ
k−α (
∑
i ui), where α > 0 is a step size. Increment
k by one and go to step i.
There are several choices for the step size α, and
several convergence results for the resulting sub-gradient
method [22].
VI. BIDDING WITH STOCHASTIC RENEWABLES AND
DEMANDS
In the previous section, the dynamics of the users
were assumed to be deterministic, i.e., the exact value
of the system state at the next instant was completely
determined by (1). This might be unrealistic keeping in
mind the stochastic nature of renewable energy as well as
user demands, etc. We begin our discussion with a special
case in which the theory can be fully developed. In this
case, which we call the Common Completely Observed
Case, the sources of stochastic uncertainty are known to
all the agents and observed causally by all of them. This
could include for example the cloud cover in Denver or
wind speed and direction in Brazos County in Texas.
A. Common Observed Randomness Case
in which Let ω = ω(1), ω(2), . . . , ω(T ) be T primitive
random variables. They can be independent and identi-
cally distributed or Markov. For simplicity, let suppose that
each ω(t) assumes value in a finite set. The state of the
i-th agent evolves as,
Xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (Xi(t), Ui(t), ω(t+ 1)),
and it is assumed that each agent observes ω causally in
time, i.e. has access to ω(1), ω(2), . . . , ω(t) at time t. Also
everybody knows the probability law P of ω. That is why
we call this the Common Observed Randomness Case. The
primitive random variables could model the wind speed in
Texas or sunlight in Denver, which everybody has access
to causally, and for which they have a dynamic model.
The problem of interest is then to, maximize the utility
function
maxE
{
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Fi(Xi(t))
}
(Common Known Randomness Problem)
for the N stochastic dynamic systems
Xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (Xi(t), ω(t)) (7)
Each Ui(t) is required to be Ft-measurable, where Ft =
σ(ω(1), ω(2), . . . , ω(t)) is the sigma-algebra generated by
the random variables ω(1), ω(2), . . . , ω(t). The inputs
Ui(t), for i = 1, 2, ..., N at each t have to satisfy the
constraint∑
i
Ui(t) = 0, for each t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (8)
We consider the following ISO based approach to solving
this problem. Let ωt = (ω(1), ω(2), . . . , ω(t)) be the past of
ω (= ωT ) until time t. The ISO announces a price random
variable λ(ω) =
(
λ(1, ω1), λ(2, ω2), . . . , λ(T, ωT )
)
for each
ω.
Note that the price announcement by the ISO is ac-
tually a policy announcement. (Much like the Federal
Reserve saying that interest rates will rise if there is a
hurricane). The ISO is saying that if the disturbances
ω(1), ω(2), . . . , ω(t) hit the system by time t, then the price
will be λ(t+ 1, ωt).
Based on this policy announcement, the individual
agents also respond with a policy. Agent i announces a
policy Ui(1, ω
1), Ui(2, ω
2), . . . , Ui(T, ω
T ). The agents de-
termine their policies individually simply by dynamic
programming since each knows the probability law for
the stochastic process ω, and their own dynamic system
model.
Now we can see that this system is amenable to
the same iteration for prices λ(w) as before, with the
only modification that the iteration process is repeated
at each time t to determine future policies. To elabo-
rate, at each time t, the ISO first announces the fu-
ture price policy as its first iterate, λ0(t, ωt), λ0(t +
1, ωt+1, . . . , λ0(T, ωT ). Each agent i then responds with
future consumption/generation policy Ui(t, ω
t), Ui(t +
1, ωt+1), . . . , Ui(T, ω
T ). The ISO computes whether there
is a net surplus or deficit of energy at each future time ,
sumNi=1Ui(t), sum
N
i=1Ui(t+ 1), ..., sum
N
i=1Ui(T ). based on
this it iterates to produce a new iterate λ1(t, ωt), λ1(t +
1, ωt+1, . . . , lambda1(T, ωT ). This iteration can be based
on a sub-gradient method where the increment is pro-
portional to the energy surplus/deficit vector. Then
the users again respond with the next iterate of the
future consumption/generation policy Ui(t, ω
t), Ui(t +
1, ωt+1), . . . , Ui(T, ω
T ). This continues until there is con-
vergence.
This is a solution of the prob-
lem Common Known Randomness Problem which
leads to optimal utility. The only issue is complexity,
since ω lies in a huge cardinality set |Ω|. Thus, we next
propose an approximation algorithm.
Approximation Algorithm with k-step Look-ahead
At each time 0 ≤ s ≤ T , the ISO announces the
prices λ(s + 1), . . . , λ(s + k) for the next k time periods,
freezing the prices after k periods. Iteration then takes
place over the k-dimensional space, and at each step
the iteration tries to achieve energy balance over the
next k time periods via bids. The idea is similar to the
Model Predictive Control (MPC), so that optimization is
performed only for k horizon look-ahead instead of entire
T horizon, thus giving us a reduction in complexity. This
policy will not approach the optimal policy even as k →∞
since it is what is called an “open loop feedback policy”.
At each time the future price sequence is assumed to
be deterministic, not a fully uncertainty state-dependent
policy.
B. The Partially Observed Randomness Case
As opposed to the assumption in the previous section,
we consider a more general case where each agent i has a
separate “private” stochastic process ωi = ωi(1), . . . , ωi(T )
affecting only his system via the equation
Xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (Xi(t), Ui(t), ωi(t+ 1)),
The stochastic process ωi is not completely observed by
the other agents, and only agent i knows the law of pro-
cess ωi. The objective function, and the constraints remain
the same as in Common Known Randomness Problem.
However the assumption that an agent does not have
access to the randomness of other agents makes it difficult
to achieve the co-operation amongst the agents.
If the goal is to optimize the utility over all decen-
tralized policies, then the ISO has to know much more
about each individual agent’s system. It needs to play a
more active role so as to induce co-operation amongst
the agents. More concretely, the ISO needs to much more
about each individual agent and its dynamic system. It
needs to know their value of the states Xi(t), utility
functions Fi(·) and their dynamics f
t
i (Xi(t), Ui(t), ωi(t))
and the probability distributions of their uncertainties ωi
of each agent i. Under this assumption, the ISO can decide
the optimal allocations U(t) for each t, as a function
of the state of the system via dynamic programming.
This procedure suffers from the curse of dimensionality
as the number of users is increased, since it amounts to
nothing less than an optimal solution of the decentralized
problem.
An optimal decentralized solution, where the solution
is itself computed in an iterative decentralized manner to
this is an interesting and open problem to pursue. What
we have done above in the Common Completely Observed
Randomness case, is demarcated a problem for which the
solution is precisely known in principle.
We now present another approach, a relaxation, that
also provides very interesting approximation algorithms
with much reduced complexity.
Free Storage Relaxation for The Relaxed Partially
Observed Randomness Problem
Let us assume that the ISO has access to a subset
of the randomness {ωi}
N
i=1, which is denoted by ω
ISO,
knows the law of ωISO, and assume ωISO to be a positive
recurrent Markov process. This is the same as assuming
that the ISO of a city has knowledge to the weather of
the city, or has knowledge of events which might alter
the electricity consumption in a big way, and knows the
probability laws governing them. However ISO doesn’t
have knowledge of the utility functions Fi of the agents,
their dynamics fi, nor the entire randomnesses ωi. Also it
is assumed that ωISO and its law are known to each agent.
The key idea for producing a tractable approximation is
to relax the constraint of energy supply equal to energy
consumption at each time t, and along each sample
path of the stochastic uncertainty, i.e., almost surely. We
replace this almost sure equality constraint at each time
t by a conditional expectation of the net power being in
balance:
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
(
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
Ui(t)1
(
ωISO(t) = w
))
= 0,
where w is any element of the state space of ωISO.
Intuitively it means that the power-balance constraint∑N
i=1 Ui(t) is allowed to be violated, however the fluc-
tuation should balance out over time, conditioned on the
ISO’s observations.
It can be shown that the optimal policy for this case is
for the ISO to declare the price at time t based on the
value of ωISO(t), with users then choosing the quantities
Ui(t) based on the value of their state Xi(t), and the
process ωISO(t). That is, an agent i need not know the
value of the state Xj(t), j 6= i, nor their utility functions
to decide the quantity Ui(t). The analysis and the proof of
optimality in the case of large number of agents is anal-
ogous to the treatment of multi-armed bandits problems
and activity allocation problems [23]–[26] and uses the
technique of large-deviations for Markov process. We note
that the relaxation provides a precise upper bound on
utility, which is the utility that can be realized in case
there is free storage. It decouples temporal constraints on
energy balance.
The Limited Lookahead Approach for the Partially
Observed Randomness Case The Limited Lookahead can
also be applied to the Partially Observed case to yield
an approach that resembles the Model Predictive Control
approach. We would like to mention in passing that
the MPC approach discussed in the Section VI-A can be
applied in order to develop an approximation algorithm
for The Partially Known Randomness Case.
At each time t, the ISO fixes a k-step random price
vector λ0 for the next k time instants. This vector will
depend only upon the ωISO in a causal way. The agents
respond to this vector via calculating optimal bids Ui for
the future time periods. Then the ISO iterates the price
upon receiving the agents’ bids. The iterations continue
till the changes in the iterates become small enough.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We illustrate the above algorithms by a simple example.
We start with a deterministic case, followed by a stochas-
tic case. Throughout this section, we assume that the N
users are divided into two groups: user i ∈ {1, ...,M} act
as residential consumers and users i ∈ {M+1, ..., N} acts
as power suppliers.
A. Deterministic case
We first define the state equations. For consumers,Xi(t)
denotes the room temperature for i-th user at time t and
Xi(t) evolves as,
Xi(t+ 1) = aiXi(t) + hi − βiUi(t), i ∈ {1, ...,M}
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Fig. 1. Convergence of the price vector for deterministic case
where ai’s and βi’s are constant and hi denotes ambient
heating. For suppliers, Xi(t) denotes the power produc-
tion level for the i-th user at time t, and it evolves as,
Xi(t+ 1) = aiXi(t) + Ui(t), i ∈ {M + 1, ..., N}
with the ai’s being constants.
There are natural constraints associated with the state
equations. For consumers, Ui(t) ≤
1
βi
(hi+ ci), where ci is
the maximal cooling rate. For suppliers, Ui(t) ≤ ri, where
ri is the maximal ramp rate allowed.
We now define the utility functions Fi. For consumers,
let
Fi(Xi(t)) = −
(
Xi(t)−
φ1i + φ2i
2
)2
+mi − λ(t)Ui(t)
where [φ1i,φ2i] is i-th user’s “comfort bounds” for temper-
ature,mi’s are constant and λ(t) is the price. For suppliers,
Fi(Xi(t)) = λ(t)Xi(t)−
(
C1iX
2
i (t) + C2iXi(t) + C3i
+C4iUi(t)) .
where C1i, C2i, C3i and C4i are cost coefficient for i-th
user.
In this case, the state equations and constraints are
linear, and the objective functions are quadratic, thus we
use QCQP (Quadratic Constrained Quadratic Program-
ming) to solve the problem. For simplicity, we let M = 5,
N = 10, hi = βi = 1, mi = 2, ai = 1 and choose φ1i
uniformly from [20, 21], φ2i from [24, 25], ri from [0.5, 1.5],
C1i from [0.9, 1.1], C2i from [0.1, 0.3], C3i from [0.5, 1.0]
and C4i from [0.1, 0.5].
Fig. 1 plots the evolution of the price vector and for
legibility of display, we only plot 4 components of λ. It
is easy to see that λ converges quite fast, in than 20
iterations.
Fig. 2 shows the demand response value as a function
of iterations. For the deterministic case, this is simply the
norm of matrix U , where U is a M × T matrix with
uij = Ui(j). Here we use Frobenius norm defined by:
||U ||F =
√∑
i
∑
j u
2
ij . Here we can see that demand
response approaches a constant as iteration goes on.
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Fig. 2. Demand Response for deterministic case
B. Stochastic case
We adopt the same notation as in the deterministic
case, but modify the state equations by adding a ran-
dom variable influencing the availability of renewable or
stochasticity of demand. For consumers,
Xi(t+ 1) = aiXi(t) + hi − βiUi(t) +W (t), i ∈ {1, ...,M}
where W (t) is not necessarily i.i.d. because of geograph-
ical and temporal correlation. Similarly, for suppliers,
Xi(t+ 1) = aiXi(t) + Ui(t) + V (t), i ∈ {M + 1, ..., N}
where V (t) is not necessarily i.i.d. either.
In our simulation, for simplicity, we let W (t) assume
two values drawn uniformly from [−0.5, 0.5], each with
probability 0.5; and let V (t) also take two values drawn
uniformly from [−0.2, 0.2], each with probability 0.5.
For each step in the model predictive control approach,
the price vector λ converges within 20 iterations, just as
it does in the deterministic case. Fig. 3 plots the demand
response value as a function of the iterations. Let Q(t) be
the vector containing only the Ui’s for i ∈ {1, ...,M}. For
display purpose, we only plot the first 4 steps and adopt
the L2 norm. As the optimization window moves, ||Q||
converges faster; whether it converges from the above or
below depends on the initial value.
C. Comparison with current ISO
The current ISO sets the price as follows: At time t,
it assumes that the demand D(t) is given, and based on
the previous step’s production level Xi(t − 1), and the
marginal cost of each producer, it assigns the production
level Xi(t) for each producer so as to minimize the
total production cost at time t. The associated Lagrange
multiplier will then be the price at time t. We set ai = 3
for i ∈ {1, ..., N}, and keep the same value for the other
parameters. Each consumer tries to keep Xi(t) =
φ1i+φ2i
2
for all t, and the resulting Ui(t) will be used to calcu-
late the demand input D(t) to the ISO scheme, where
D(t) :=
∑
i Ui(t) for i ∈ {1, ...,M}.
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Fig. 4 summarizes the results. By fixing the uncertainty
magnitude ||W || = 0, the figure on the left shows that
λISO, which is generated by the ISO scheme, has a bigger
variance σ2ISO than λ, which is obtained by our iterative
approach. Moreover the difference in variance becomes
even larger as ai increases. The figure on the right fixes
|ai| = 1 and plots changes in the variance of price as a
function of ||W ||. Similarly in the left figure, the difference
in variance increases as ||W || increases.
Next we compare the total utility of the entire system
obtained by the two approaches. Notice that in our case
the total utility is,
u =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
Fi(Xi(t)) =
T∑
t=1

 ∑
i∈{1,...,M}
−
(
Xi(t)−
φ1i + φ2i
2
)2
+mi
−
∑
i∈{M+1,...,N}
C1iX
2
i (t) + C2iXi(t) + C3i + C4iUi(t)


as the λ terms cancel out. We calculate the total utility
incurred by the two schemes; the results are shown in
Table I. It can be seen that the total utility obtained by
our dynamic iterative approach is roughly three times the
TABLE I
TOTAL UTILITY OBTAINED BY ISO SCHEME AND THE ITERATIVE APPROACH
Name The iterative approach ISO scheme
Value 427.1932 142.8451
TABLE II
TOTAL EXPECTED UTILITY OBTAINED BY ISO SCHEME AND THE ITERATIVE
APPROACH
Name The MPC approach ISO scheme
Value 500.2578 159.2198
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Fig. 5. Changes in total utility as |ai| or ||W || varies
total utility obtained by the greedy ISO scheme. (Note
that this coincides with the setting of ai = 3.)
The above considers the case where demand is deter-
ministic. When there is randomness from the demand
side, the ISO scheme aims at minimizing the expected
production cost at each time t. We assume for simplicity
that the added noise term W (t) is i.i.d. and takes values
0.5 and −0.5 each with probability 0.5. Similarly, as in
the deterministic case, we calculate the total expected
utility incurred by the two schemes and present the
results in Table II. It can be seen that the total expected
utility obtained by the MPC approach is more than three
times the expected utility obtained by the ISO scheme.
We conclude that in both deterministic and stochastic
cases, our approach provides greater total utility than the
current ISO scheme.
We also compare the change in total utility obtained as
a function of ai for the two schemes. We fix |ai| = 1
and let W (t) be i.i.d. taking values ||W || and −||W ||
with probabilities 0.5 and 0.5 respectively. We observe
the change in total utility while increasing the noise
magnitude ||W ||. The result is shown in the left plot in
Fig. 5. It can be seen that as ||W || increases, the total
utility obtained by the MPC is not a strict linear function
of the utility obtained by the ISO scheme. The plot on the
right fixes ||W || = 0, and shows that as |ai| increases, the
difference in utility obtained increases as well.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have formulated the problem of allocating the
power demands and generations over the heterogeneous
energy consuming or producing agents or prosumers,
connected to a smart-grid in a dynamic fashion, both
under a deterministic setting and a stochastic setting
when there are underlying uncertainties affecting both
generation as well as consumption. We have proposed
decentralized iterative algorithms to solve this problem.
These algorithms work under the assumption of local
knowledge, i.e., an agent needs to keep track of only its
own randomness and its own system dynamics. We have
shown that the ISO can play a central role in inducing
co-operation amongst the agents by declaring policies. A
possibly significant theoretical contribution is that in the
common completely observed randomness case, there is
an ISO strategy that achieves social welfare optimality.
It incorporates decentralized dynamics where there is no
need for agents to be aware of each others’ dynamics or
states. The only communication from the ISO is price
policy and from the agents their energy consumption
or generation in response to the price. We have also
proposed more computationally tractable policies for this
case. For the case of Partially Observed Randomness case,
we have further indicated a relaxation that significantly
reduces complexity, as well as an MPC approach that is
tractable. Some simulation results showing that the pro-
posed algorithms appear to outperform the current ISO
practices in terms of the net social welfare are provided.
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